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AN INFORMATIONAL APPROACH TO THE MASS
IMPRISONMENT PROBLEM
Adam M. Gershowitzt
The United States is plagued by the problem of mass imprisonment, with
its prison population having risen by 500% in the last three decades.
Because the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are resolved through
plea bargaining, there is room for prosecutors to reduce mass
imprisonment by exercising their wide discretion. At present, prosecutors
likely do not give much consideration to the overcrowding of America's
jails and prisons when making their plea bargain offers. However, if
prosecutors were regularly advised of such overcrowding they might offer
marginally lower sentences across the board. For instance, a prosecutor
who typically offers a first-time drug offender a twenty-month sentence
might instead agree to an eighteen-month plea bargain if she were aware
that prisons were overcrowded and incarceration rates were on the rise. A
rich body of social psychology literature supports the view that informing
prosecutors about mass imprisonment might cause them to offer lower
sentences. Legislatures have an incentive to enact such a proposal because
a reduction in incarceration would reduce the already huge and escalating
costs of criminal corrections. At the same time, because legislatures would
simply be instructing that prosecutors be advised of the scale of
imprisonment, and not specifically advocating lower sentences, there would
be no danger of legislators appearing "soft on crime. "
Criminal justice in America is not a zero-sum game. When legislatures
enact new criminal statutes, they are under no requirement to decriminalize
old behavior. 1 And when judges sentence individuals to prison, they are
under no obligation to ensure that other convicts are released. Criminal

t Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I am grateful to Rachel
Barkow, Geoff Com, Ken Haas, Andrew Solomon, Donna Shetowsky, Dru Stevenson, Ron
Wright, and Kevin Yamamoto for helpful suggestions and to Monica Ortale, Jessica Sloman,
and Michael Weems for research assistance.
I.
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) ("Since all change in criminal law seems to push in the same direction-toward
more liability-this state of affairs is growing worse: legislatures regularly add to criminal
codes, but rarely subtract from them.").
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justice is, therefore, like a "one-way ratchet," 2 with the possibility of
incarceration increasing each year. 3
To combat this one-way ratchet, the criminal justice system puts its faith
in prosecutorial discretion. 4 The overwhelming majority of prosecutors are
reasonable and exercise their discretion soundly. Moreover, prosecutors'
offices have annual budgets, and those funds will only permit a certain
number of prosecutions in a given year. 5 Thus, in theory, the problems of
overcriminalization and overincarceration should be limited by the reasoned
judgment of prosecutors and the financial pressures they face. Yet,
incarceration rates are at record levels and continue to climb. 6
One of the key problems 7 appears to be that while prosecutors are
generally constrained by their financial resources and their reasoned
2.
See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
719 (2005) ("[L]awmakers have a strong incentive to add new offenses and enhanced penalties,
which offer ready-made publicity stunts, but face no countervailing political pressure to scale
back the criminal justice system."). A recent and provocative article disputes the widely
accepted view that criminal legislation is pathologically one directional. See Darryl K. Brown,
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REv. 223 (2007) .
3.
See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 214 (rev. ed. 2006) ("The current figure of
incarcerated people-more than two million--continues to climb each year ...."); see also
Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX.
L. REv. 1693, 1693 (2006) ("The U.S. incarceration rate has accelerated dramatically,
increasing more than five-fold between 1971 and 2000.").
4.
See Stuntz, supra note I, at 509.
As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the
hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who
goes to prison and for how long. The end point of this progression is clear:
criminal codes that cover everything and decide nothing, that serve only to
delegate power to district attorneys' offices and police departments.

!d.
5.
See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, AI Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 601 (2005) ("Extreme
docket pressure characterizes DAs' offices, particularly in the large cities where crime rates tend
to be highest. It follows that criminal litigation must be rationed not only based on political
necessity but also based on cost."); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HAR.v. L. REv. 2548, 2553-55 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining] (discussing pressures created by budget constraints). At the federal level, budgets
are sometimes less constraining. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence,
Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REv. 393, 443-46 (2001).
6.
Between 1972 and 2003 the incarceration rate grew by more than 500 %. See MAUER,
supra note 3, at 1.
7.
There are numerous reasons for the drastic increase in incarceration over the last
several decades. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT
119-36 (1991) (reviewing multiple explanations for the incarceration increase and fmding a
lack of empirical support). I do not mean to suggest that prosecutorial discretion is the cause of
skyrocketing incarceration but, instead, that providing prosecutors with information about other
parts of the criminal justice system may decrease or stem the increase of incarceration.
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judgment, prosecution resources are often greater than defense resources
and bear little or no relation to the amount of funding for prisons and jails. 8
On a day to day basis, most prosecutors are probably not cognizant of the
lack of resources held by the rest of the criminal justice system. 9 It is safe to
assume that when prosecutors walk into court, they do not ask themselves
whether there is sufficient funding to provide lawyers for all indicted
defendants or whether there are enough prison or jail beds for everyone who
will be convicted. 10
Prosecutors rarely consider such external questions because they are
focused on two threshold matters: (1) the facts of the individual case at
hand; and (2) whether the prosecutor's office (as opposed to the prison
warden or the public defender's office) has adequate resources to handle the
case. 11 Accordingly, prosecutors bring the number of cases that their offices
can handle, rather than the number that would be optimal from a systematic
standpoint under existing budgets. 12
8.
See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006) (discussing the funding imbalance between
prosecutors and lawyers for indigent defendants); Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof A
Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REv. 85 (2007) (same); Erica J. Hashimoto, The
Price ofMisdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 461 (2007) (same);.
9.
See JOSEPH DILLON DAVEY, THE POLITICS OF PRISON EXPANSION 83 (1998) ("[E]very
day countless offenders are prosecuted by locally elected prosecutors and sentenced to state
prison by locally elected judges who have little or no concern about how those prisons are
funded."); ZIMRJNG & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 140 ("To judges and prosecutors
imprisonment may seem to be available as a free good or service or at least may be viewed as
the subject of major state government subsidy."); John P. Heinz & Peter M. Manikas, Networks
Among Elites in a Local Criminal Justice System, 26 LAW & Soc'y REv. 831, 838, 853 (1992)
(interviewing over 200 key players in the Cook County, Illinois criminal justice system and
finding that "[m]ost players ... appear to be highly specialized to their particular functions and
to have little concern about the operation of the system as a whole"); Robert L. Misner,
Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRJM. L. & CRJMINOLOGY 717, 764 (1996) ("From the
prosecutors' perspective, current prison funding practices create effectively unlimited prison
budgets. Prosecutors simply continue to prosecute individuals despite whether the level of
imprisonment will force the state prison to spend more money than its budget permits.").
10. With respect to incarceration, Zimring and Hawkins have called this the equivalent of
a "correctional free lunch" because to prosecutors the "marginal cost of an extra prisoner may
be zero at the local level of government, where the decision to confine is made." ZIMRJNG &
HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 211.
11. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 ( 1997). Prosecutors have less freedom with respect to
the types of cases they bring. Professors Richman and Stuntz argue that state prosecutors have
little room to choose the types of cases they want because they are subject to electoral and
media pressures that "reinforce their tendency to concentrate on a small list of politically
important crimes." Richman & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 602-03.
12. See Misner, supra note 9, at 719 (explaining that the problem with prosecutorial
discretion is that it does not "force [prosecutors] to face the full cost of prosecutorial
decisions").
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If prosecutors convict as many people as the law (and their budget)
permits, they may well convict more defendants than the prison budget can
handle. Because it would be politically unpopular to release such criminals
due to overcrowding, legislatures are then forced to make supplemental
appropriations for prisons, thus permitting incarceration rates to climb. 13
The purpose of this article is not to criticize the existence of
prosecutorial discretion or to question the ethics of the lawyers exercising
that discretion. 14 Instead, I explore a less recognized problem with
prosecutorial discretion, namely that we ask prosecutors to use their
discretion without reference to the resources held by the other parts of the
criminal justice system.
This article explores the possibility of making prosecutors more
cognizant about the funding of the rest of the criminal justice system, and
whether access to such information would affect prosecutors' charging/ 5
plea-bargaining, and dismissal decisions. 16 In short, this article proposes that
legislatures require that prosecutors be regularly advised about prison
capacity and conditions. Prosecutors should be informed about the total
number of inmates incarcerated, the percentage of prison capacity filled, the
increase in prison population over the last few years, and whether any
prisons in the jurisdiction are under court supervision because of
overcrowding or confinement conditions. Social psychology research
suggests that simply being advised of the problem of prison overcrowding
13. See, e.g., Ann Imse, Prison Trend Costly: Inmates Enter State's Cellblocks at Rate
Well Above Average, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 19, 2006, at A4 ("'It's going to eat up our
entire budget,' [a budget committee member] said when the Joint Budget Committee was told in
January that it had to come up with half a billion dollars to house 7,000 more prisoners in the
next five years.").
14. There is, of course, a rich body of scholarship questioning these very issues. On the
sub-surface problem of prosecutorial discretion, see William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes:
Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule ofLaw, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 3 77
(Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (explaining that giving prosecutors wide discretion to invoke
lengthy punishments makes it "cheaper" for legislatures to enact such punishments and to use
legislation to make symbolic statements). For a collection of how prosecutors might misuse
their discretion, see JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (3d ed. 2003).
15. For an argument that prosecutors should engage in far more rigorous screening in lieu
of charge bargaining, see generally Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REv. 29 (2002). On the current lack of incentives for prosecutors to avoid
overcharging, see generally Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851
(1995).
16. As Daniel Richman and Bill Stuntz have pointed out, a "small but important part of
state criminal codes are politically mandatory. Local prosecutors do not have the option of
ignoring violent felonies and major thefts." See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 600.
However, while it would be inconceivable for prosecutors to dismiss these cases outright, they
could offer less punitive plea bargains.
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may serve to influence prosecutors' charging, dismissal, and pleabargaining decisions. 17 And while advising prosecutors of such information
will not undo the mass imprisonment in the United States, it may serve, at
least on a small scale, to begin de-escalation. 18
Part I of this article briefly reviews the problem of mass imprisonment.
Part II then explains how the United States Supreme Court's refusal to limit
legislatures' power to criminalize behavior or impose excessive
punishments prevents the judiciary from reducing mass imprisonment.
Because the judiciary will not intervene, Part III considers whether
legislatures might attempt to de-escalate mass imprisonment by mandating a
simple informational campaign directed at prosecutors. Part III relies on
social psychology literature to demonstrate that the simple act of advising
prosecutors about funding problems might reduce the severity of
prosecutors' plea bargain offers. Finally, Part IV asserts that the proposal is
realistic. This proposal would not hinder legislators' efforts to be tough on
crime because it would not alter their power to criminalize behavior or to
impose stiff sanctions. In addition, the prospect of saving millions of dollars
in annual criminal justice expenses provides a strong incentive for
legislatures to consider the proposal. 19

17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. Because America's prison industrial complex is entrenched, it is implausible to
suggest it can be drastically altered. As Professor Marie Gottschalk has recently explained,
"[n]o single factor" can bring about the demise of America's extreme incarceration problem.
Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 1705; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Don't Blame Determinacy: U.S.
Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1787, 1789-90
(2006) ("[T]he current decade would retain [the] dubious honor [of being the most punitive
decade in history] even if confinement populations were to go into moderate decline.").
19. Scholars are beginning to recognize legislators' interest in cutting criminal justice
costs. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 1276, 1285-90 (2005) (explaining that states pay close attention to corrections
expenditures because it makes up a significant portion of state budgets); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REv.
1315, 1345-46 (2005) (comparing state budgeting to federal, and noting that states are required
to balance their budgets between schools and prisons while Congress does not have such
constraints); Brown, supra note 2, at 233, 252; Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 1698 ("As the fastest
growing item in most state budgets, corrections became a target for budget cutters."); Daniel
Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2056, 2065
(2006) (explaining that the literature "tends to treat prosecutorial interests as monolithic" but
that "state officials who have to actually pay for prisons" may be less prone to policies that
increase incarceration).
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THE PERVASIVE PROBLEM OF MASS lMPRISONMENT 20

A.

Imprisonment by the Numbers

At present, there are nearly 2.2 million people incarcerated in our
nation's prisons and jails. 21 Excluding children and the elderly, nearly one
in fifty people in the United States wakes up behind bars each moming. 22
The United States incarcerates more offenders per capita than any
industrialized nation in the world: 23 three times more than Israel, five times
more than England, six times more than Australia and Canada, eight times
more than France, and over twelve times more than Japan. 24 Given these
ratios, it is not surprising that American prisoners convicted of violent
crimes are incarcerated for five to ten times as long as their European
counterparts. 25 And while European nations rarely incarcerate nonviolent
property and drug offenders, more than half of the people imprisoned in the
United States have committed nonviolent crimes. 26
More telling than the total number of prisoners or the international
comparisons is the upward historical trend in the United States. As Michael
Jacobson has observed, "every state increased the size of its prison system
over the last decade." 27 Between 1972 and 2003, the national prison
20. The term "mass imprisonment" was coined by David Garland. See David Garland, The
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
1 (David Garlanded., 2001) ("Mass imprisonment implies a rate of imprisonment and a size of
prison population that is markedly above the historical and comparative norm for societies of
this type.").
21. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215092,
PRISONERS IN 2005, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p05.pdf.
22. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006).
23. See id.
24. See MAUER, supra note 3, at 20-21; MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: How
TO REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2005) ("The United States now locks up a
higher percentage of its population than any country in the world."); see also BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 30 (2006) ("Although the U.S. incarceration rate had
long been higher than in most western European countries, the imprisonment gap between
Europe and the United States widened significantly in the period of the prison boom [from the
1970s to the tum of the century].").
25. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 22, at 21 ("Violent offenders in the United States spend
five to ten times as long in prison as those in France.").
26. See id.
27. JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 33. However, the size of the increase has varied
considerably among the states. See John F. Pfaff, The Growth of Prisons: Toward a Second
Generation Approach 4 (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Working Paper No.
976373, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=976373.
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population rose by 500%. 28 There were approximately 330,000 individuals
in America's prisons and jails in 1973/9 which amounted to approximately
160 inmates per every 100,000 people in the United States. 30 Over the next
three decades, the number of inmates and the rate per 100,000 Americans
steadily climbed. In 1985, 313 per 100,000 people were incarcerated. 31 By
1995, the rate had risen to 601 per 100,000 people. 32 In its most recent
estimate at mid-year 2005, the Bureau of Justice Statistics placed the rate at
738 prison and jail inmates per 100,000 people. 33
The drastic increase in imprisonment has had significant financial
consequences. As a result of the increase in the prison population, the
United States was required to open the equivalent of one prison per week
during the period from 1985 to 2000. 34 The cost of locking up an offender
for a single year exceeds $22,000. 35 In some states, the cost is double that
amount. 36 All told, the United States spends approximately $60 billion
annually on corrections. 37
And it is often questionable whether counties, states, and the federal
government are spending enough money to keep up with the crushing
number of incarcerated individuals. Many prisons and jails throughout the
country are overcrowded. A recent study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
found that federal prisons held nearly 111,000 prisoners even though the
facilities were only rated to handle approximately 83,000 individuals. 38 On
average, state prison facilities were also operating in excess of their
28. See MAUER, supra note 3, at I. The dramatic increase in incarceration beginning in the
1970s stands in stark contrast to the early decades of the Twentieth Century. As Marc Mauer
has explained, there was "remarkable stability in incarceration, hovering around 200,000
inmates" during the "forty-five year period leading up to the 1970s." !d. at 18.
29. See id. at 17.
30. See id.
31. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
488 tbl.6.13 (2003).
32. See id.
33. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213133,
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 2 tbl.l (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05 .pdf.
34. See MAUER, supra note 3, at 1-2; see also DAVEY, supra note 9, at 2 ("The federal
government constructed twenty-six new federal prisons in 1996, while the states were
constructing ninety-five new prisons.").
35. See JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 202949, STATE PRISON
EXPENDITURES, 200 I, at I (2004), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/speO !.pdf.
36. See id. at 3. Remarkably, in 2001, Maine expended more than $44,000 to incarcerate a
single offender for a single year, whereas Alabama spent approximately $8000. !d.
37. See JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 53; MAUER, supra note 3, at 92.
38. See JAMES J. STEPHAN & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 198272,
CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000, at 4 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csfcroO.pdf.

HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 53 2008

54

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

capacity. 39 And while the construction of new prisons across the country has
reduced overcrowding, 145 of 1668 prisons in existence in 2000 were under
court orders to reduce their populations. 40 This is to say nothing of the
overcrowding in hundreds of the nation's jails41 that are not analyzed by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 42

B.

The Roots of the Problem

It is undisputed that incarceration rates have exploded at the federal and
state level over the last few decades. 43 The harder question is: Why? 44
Experts have long maintained that the increase in prison population cannot
easily be tied to rising crime rates. 45 Conversely, criminologists maintain the
39. See id.
40. See id. at 5 tb1.9, 9 tbl.l5.
41. See, e.g., Steve McVicker, Jail Crowding: Sheriff Appealing Order, Won't Transfer
Inmates, HOUSTON CHRON., May 6, 2006, at B 1 ("State inspectors have withheld certification
from the downtown [Harris] [C]ounty jail system for the past three years, largely because of
inmate crowding ...."); Steve McVicker & Bill Murphy, County Jail Conditions Condemned
in Report, HouSTON CHRON., July 16, 2005, at Al (explaining that 1300 inmates in the
downtown Harris County jail were sleeping on mattresses on the floor and that jails in forty
other Texas counties were in violation of state standards).
42. The overcrowding in tum leads to an increase in physical violence, inadequate and
slow medical care, and a host of additional costly problems. See STEPHEN & KARBERG, supra
note 38, at 9 (detailing how inmate-on-inmate assaults climbed by 32% between 1995 and
2000); Steve McVicker, County Jail Deaths on Pace To Double '06 Total, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Apr. 8, 2007, at A1 (discussing deaths of inmates in the Harris County jail who were awaiting
trial and attributing some deaths to poor medical care); Steve McVicker & Anita Hassan,
Deaths Behind Bars, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 18, 2007, at Al ("Records and interviews show
that almost one-third of the [ 101] deaths involve questions of inadequate responses from guards
and staff, failure by jail officials to provide inmates with essential medical and psychiatric care
and medications, unsanitary conditions, and two allegations of physical abuse by guards.").
43. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 2, at 710 ("Both federal and state governments have
contributed over the past quarter century to a punishment binge of unprecedented size and
scope."); Gottschalk, supra note 3, at 1693.
44. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 22, at 18 ("What caused the country's incarceration
boom ... ha[s] not been a major focus of social science research or public concern."); ZIMRING
& HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 119-36.
45. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 124 (explaining that while variations in
crime are not unrelated to prison populations, there is a "lack of a direct and simple relationship
that would enable us to successfully explain most fluctuations in the rate of imprisonment by
reference to changes in crime rates"). More recently, see MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME 98 (2004) ("The best available evidence shows that gross crime trends are determined by
fundamental social and structural forces that affect most Western countries, and that they follow
much the same broad patterns irrespective of national differences in crime control policies and
punishment practices."); Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice
Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 397, 41415 nn.63 & 64 (2006) (collecting additional sources).

HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 54 2008

40:0047]

MASS IMPRISONMENT PROBLEM

55

drastic increase in imprisonment has not led to a substantial decrease in
crime rates. 46 Instead, observers explain the incarceration expansion by
pointing to certain criminal justice policies. 47 The standard argument is that
mandatory minimum statutes, three strikes laws, and the rise of determinate
sentencing have resulted in a dramatic increase in the prison population. 48
Other observers point to the reduction in the use of probation and parole. 49
Still others raise concern about a variation of Parkinson's Law, 50 whereby
new prison construction inevitably leads to trial-level actors simply finding
46. See WESTERN, supra note 24, at 185 ("Roughly nine-tenths of the decline in serious
crime through the 1990s would have happened even without the prison boom."). According to
Bruce Western, no more than two to five percent of the decline in serious crime from 1993 to
2001 resulted from the sixty-six percent increase in incarceration during that period. See id. at
191. Given that the annual cost of imprisonment is roughly $22,000 per offender, Western
maintains that the use of incarceration to accomplish a minimal reduction in crime cost $53
billion during that period. See id. at 187. But see Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime
Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON.
PERSP. 163, 177-79 (2004) (concluding that the increased prison population was one of the
major causes of the dramatic drop in crime during the 1990s).
47. See DAVEY, supra note 9, at 47 ("How is it that crime could have become such a
public obsession when ... the crime rate hit a peak of 41 million offenses in 1981 and has been
falling ever since (to around 34 million offenses in recent years)?"). As Marc Mauer has
explained:
A study of the California prison population in the 1990s funded by the
California legislature concluded that as many as a quarter of incoming
inmates to the prison system would be appropriate candidates for diversion to
community-based programs. This group would include offenders sentenced
to prison for technical violations of parole, minor drug use, or nonviolent
property offenses. The study estimated that diverting such offenders would
save 17-20 percent of the corrections operating budget for new prison
admissions.
MAUER, supra note 3, at 33-35.
48. See Mary Price, Mandatory Minimums in the Federal System: Turning a Blind Eye to
Justice, 31 HuM. RTS., Winter 2004, at 8, 9 ("Mandatory minimum sentences are the
sledgehammers of sentencing."). The conventional argument has been criticized on multiple
grounds, including that many states which continue to maintain indeterminate sentencing
schemes have experienced explosions in prison growth. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 22, at 39
("Prison populations began rising in many states long before determinate sentencing laws were
enacted."); Reitz, supra note 18, at 1794-99 (explaining that most of the states with the largest
prison growth have indeterminate sentencing schemes and that of the states that have moved to
determinate sentencing schemes most have had lower prison growth than the national average).
49. See PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 170032
TRUTH
IN
SENTENCING
IN
STATE
PRISONS
3-4
(1999),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf ("As a result of truth-in-sentencing practices, the
State prison population is expected to increase through the incarceration of more offenders for
longer periods of time.").
50. Parkinson's Law states that "[w]ork expands so as to fill the time available for its
completion." C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON'S LAW AND OTHER STUDIES IN
ADMINISTRATION 2 (1957).
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new occupants for those prison cells. 51 Experts also point to the expansion
of private prisons in recent years/ 2 explaining that prison companies have
an incentive to expand the number of prisoners in order to provide a market
for their services53 and that prison guard unions have a similar interest in
seeing incarceration .numbers climb. 54 Finally, whether privately or publicly
operated, prisons provide many local communities ravaged by the loss of
industry with jobs and economic stimulus that the communities will fight
hard to retain. 55
In addition to the above mentioned explanations, 56 at least one scholar
has suggested that prison expansion is traceable to particular actors-such
as prosecutors-who have discretion to deal with criminal cases. 57 Professor
Joseph Dillon Davey contends that:
The most important influence on the rapid expansion of prisons in
the United States during the last two decades appears to be
informal changes in the system of criminal justice, which grow out
of a new attitude toward punishment. The amount of discretion
exercised by street-level bureaucrats in the criminal justice system
is a major, driving force in the increase in rates of imprisonment.
.. . [T]he initial problem of prison overcrowding grows out of a

51. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 76-77 (discussing efforts to test this
hypothesis).
52. Private prisons are a billion-dollar-per-year business. See JACOBSON, supra note 24, at
64 (explaining that private prisons house less than six percent of the nation's inmates). Of
course, the fact that private prisons account for a relatively small percentage of the nation's
prison population tends to demonstrate that it is only one cause (and perhaps a small one at that)
ofthe many factors leading to mass imprisonment. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 22, at 30.
53. See JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 65 ("[T]he prison industry has a structural selfinterest in continuing to expand the market (prisoners) in order to capture a greater market share
....").
54. See id. at 67-69. Some communities even lobby to have prisons built in their
backyards because they create construction jobs and other full-time employment opportunities.
See id. at 70-71. Put simply, "whoever provides prison services will seek to influence the
political process." Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1838,
1873 n.33 (2002).
55. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 22, at 29 (describing "penal Keynesianism"); Peter T.
Kilborn, Rural Towns Turn to Prisons to Reignite Their Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I, 2001,
at AI ("More than a Wal-Mart or a meat-packing plant, state, federal and private prisons,
typically housing 1,000 inmates and providing 300 jobs, can put a town on solid economic
footing.").
56. The list of explanations I have mentioned is certainly not exclusive. For instance,
Bruce Western maintains that the reason for the incarceration of huge numbers of black youth
can be traced to "the collapse of urban labor markets and the creation of jobless ghettos in
America's inner cities." WESTERN, supra note 24, at 78.
57. See DAVEY, supra note 9, at 92-93.
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change in attitude among the minions of the criminal justice
system who make the majority of decisions about prison use. 58

In addition to the power held by prosecutors, Professor Davey also points
to judges' sentencing discretion, probation officers' authority in writing
presentence reports, and parole officers' influence in determining whether
to return individuals to prison. 59 While all of these actors-particularly
prosecutors-have enormous discretion, Professor Davey maintains that the
exercise of that discretion is strongly affected by whether or not the state's
governor has created a "law and order" atmosphere. 60 Put simply, trial-level
actors have wide discretion, but that discretion can be influenced to
encourage more or less punitiveness.
If Professor Davey is correct, then there is a prospect of de-escalating the
mass imprisonment problem by signaling to trial-level actors that they
should be more cautious about relying on incarceration. As discussed below
in Part II, the Supreme Court certainly has not given such a signal. To the
contrary, the Court has taken a hands off approach.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO STEP IN

A.

The Power to Criminalize Almost Anything

Although the Supreme Court heavily regulates the criminal justice
system, its regulation focuses almost exclusively on criminal procedure,
rather than the substance of criminal law. 61 Accordingly, legislatures are
free to enact virtually any laws they wish without interference from the
courts.

58. !d.
59. See id. For instance, as Michael Jacobson recounts: "It took only days [as the new
director of the New York City] Department of Correction for me to realize that almost one of
every five inmates in the entire system was there as a result of breaking one or more of the rules
of being on parole." JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 4. "In many states, technical parole violators
make up the largest single category of prison admissions." !d. at 40.
60. See DAVEY, supra note 9, at 95 ("It is my argument here that in the states where the
executive created an atmosphere of law and order, prison populations explode, whereas in the
states where the atmosphere was less intemperate, the populations grew slowly.").
61. See Stuntz, supra note II ("Constitutionally speaking, substantive criminal law is
almost entirely unregulated."); see also Luna, supra note 2, at 724 ("The one government body
that could check political excesses and curb the overcriminalization phenomenon, the American
judiciary, has largely failed to do so."); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the CivilCriminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES I, 1 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-Criminal
Line] ("[T]he law of crimes is not very heavily constitutionalized ....").
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In the late 1950s and early 1960s it looked as if the Supreme Court might
be willing to engage in some regulation of substantive criminal law. In
Lambert v. California, decided in 1957, the Court struck down a law
making it a crime for a convicted felon to remain in Los Angeles for more
than five days without registering with the police. 62 The Court recognized
that legislators have "wide latitude" to defme criminal infractions, but
explained that since Lambert had no knowledge of her duty to register and
had been "wholly passive," it would violate due process to convict her of
the offense. 63 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter predicted that the Court's
decision would tum out to be "an isolated deviation from the strong current
of precedents-a derelict on the waters ofthe law."64
Although Justice Frankfurter's prediction turned out to be correct, the
Court did take one additional detour into the world of substantive criminal
law a few years later. In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court struck
down a law making it a crime for a person to "be addicted to the use of
narcotics."65 The Court concluded that it would be cruel and unusual
punishment to convict someone for a "status" rather than a particular act. 66
The Robinson decision seemed to signal that there would be constitutional
scrutiny of criminal blameworthiness and more rigorous oversight of strict
liability crimes. 67 Yet, that rigorous oversight did not come to pass. Only a
few years later, in Powell v. Texas, the Court refused to find
unconstitutional a statute making it a crime to be "found in a state of
intoxication in any public place."68 And since Powell, it is nearly impossible
to find a non-capital case 69 in which the Court has restricted legislatures'
power to criminalize. 70
62. 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). One scholar has remarked that Frankfurter's
comment is a "curse" that "appears to have stuck." Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution,
and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1270 (1998).
65. 370 U.S. 660, 662-67 (1962).
66. See id. at 667 ("Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for
the 'crime' of having a common cold.").
67. See Daniel Suleiman, Note, The Capital Punishment Exception: A Case for
Constitutionalizing the Substantive Criminal Law, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 426, 432 (2004).
68. 392 U.S. 514,517,536--37 (1968).
69. In the realm of capital cases, the Court has precluded the death penalty for the crime of
raping an adult woman as well as for certain felony murders, and for juveniles and the mentally
retarded. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 Mo. L. REv. 73,
86--88 (2007) (discussing cases).
70. Recent criminal procedure cases reinforce this conclusion. See Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 321-22 (2001) (rejecting petitioner's argument that a city should not
be constitutionally permitted to make a minor, fine-only infraction grounds for a custodial
arrest); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996) (rejecting defendant's contention that
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Where then does that leave us? As Professor Stuntz has stated, Lambert's
progeny is almost nonexistent and the Powell decision "basically undoes
Robinson." 71 In effect, the Supreme Court has completely abdicated the
field of substantive criminal law. 72 The reason for the abdication is less
clear, though Professor Erik Luna may well be correct that the Court simply
does not want to appear to be a "Lochner-esque super-legislature."73 And
although scholars throughout the decades have been highly critical of the
Court's failure to regulate the substance of criminal law74 and have
proposed a number of ways to impose such limits/ 5 all evidence indicates
that the Court will continue to ignore these suggestions.

B.

The Power to Impose Almost Any Punishment

Just as the Court has refused to limit legislatures' power to criminalize
behavior, it also has been extremely wary of meddling with the punishment
decisions of legislatures and juries. As explained below, the Court has made
clear that, with the exception of death-penalty cases, legislatures can punish
defendants as harshly as they want without fear that courts will strike down
the sentences as unconstitutionally excessive.
For over a century, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment" permits courts to strike down prison sentences simply because
they are too long. In 1892, Justice Stephen Field contended that a fifty-four
year sentence for selling liquor without authority violated the Eighth
Amendment. 76 Although Justice Field's position did not carry the day, a
majority of the Court did subsequently find a sentence of fifteen years

automobiles are so heavily regulated that total compliance would be impossible and that a
heightened standard should be imposed for traffic stops).
71. Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 61, at 5 n.ll, 6 n.l3.
72. See id. at 13 (explaining that the definition of crime is left entirely to the political
branches).
73. Luna, supra note 2, at 724.
74. Most famously, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 431 (1958) ("What sense does it make to insist upon procedural
safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first
place?''); see also Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 61, at 13.
75. For two of the more prominent examples, see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B.
Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J.
1325, 1376-79 (1979) (tying a proportionality requirement to the legislatively defined elements
of the crime): Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra note 61 (advocating constitutional regulation
of mens rea and use of the doctrine of desuetude).
76. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
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imprisonment at hard labor to be unconstitutionally excessive for the
relatively minor offense of falsifying an official public document. 77
Several decades later, the Court struggled with the proportionality of
long prison sentences for a series of very minor offenses. In 1980, the Court
held that a sentence of life imprisonment for a recidivist who had
conunitted three nonviolent property felonies involving less than $230 was
constitutional because the "length of the sentence actually imposed is purely
a matter of legislative prerogative." 78 Yet, three years later, the Court
seemingly reversed its position again by holding a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a recidivist who had
conunitted seven nonviolent offenses to be excessive. 79
The Court's indecisiveness on the proportionality issue came to an end in
the early 1990s. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court upheld a sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the crime of
possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. 80 While recognizing the
existence of a "narrow proportionality principle," Justice Kennedy's
plurality opinion made clear that successful challenges to long prison
sentences would be extremely rare. 81 And since Harmelin it is nearly
impossible to find any federal court willing to strike down a prison sentence
as disproportionateY As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court has reiterated
its opposition to proportionality review when it upheld California's "Three
Strikes and You're Out" recidivism statute. 83
In short, federal proportionality review of criminal punishments is all but
dead. And while certain state courts have engaged in more rigorous
proportionality review by looking to their own state constitutions, 84
successful excessiveness challenges are still rare. As a result, when
legislatures enact lengthy sentencing ranges, mandatory minimum statutes,
77. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357-58, 382 (1910). In addition to the
imprisonment and hard labor, Weems was forbidden from becoming a parent, administering
property, voting, or holding office, and he was sentenced to a lifetime of perpetual surveillance.
See id. at 364--65.
78. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980). Shortly thereafter, the Court upheld
a forty-year sentence for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana. See
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,371,375 (1982) (per curiam).
79. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,282-84 (1983).
80. 501 u.s. 957, 961, 996 (1991).
81. !d. at 996, 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive
Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REv. 1249, 1276--79 (2000).
83. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14,20 (2003).
84. See, e.g., People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Mich. 1992) (construing the same
statute that was at issue in Harmelin and concluding that the Michigan state constitution should
be interpreted "more broadly" than the United States Constitution).
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three-strikes-and-you're-out-laws, and other tough-on-crime measures, trial
judges are obligated to impose those stiff sentences irrespective of the
circumstances. Because there is no judicial counterbalance to increasingly
punitive laws, prosecutorial discretion becomes the main outlet for relief.
And when political campaigns force each candidate or legislator to be
tougher on crime than his opponent, the sentencing ranges and mandatory
minimums become even longer. The result is more mass imprisonment.

C.

Limited Oversight of Prison Condition Cases

Because so many defendants are sentenced to incarceration, prison
officials are forced to scramble to find enough space to house them. 85 Often
there are simply not enough beds and prisons are forced to operate above
capacity. 86 This in tum leads to prison overcrowding, which in tum leads to
litigation. 87
The litigation manifests itself in a variety of ways. Prisoners challenge
the plain existence of the overcrowding. 88 They also contend that the
overcrowding has led to other problematic conditions of confinement, such
as unsanitary facilities, inadequate staffing, poor medical care, heightened
levels of tension and violence, and a higher incidence of sexual assault. 89
85. See Kilborn, supra note 55 (explaining that all of the inmates in a rural Oklahoma
prison are from Wisconsin, which sends more than 4000 inmates to out-of-state prisons because
it lacks the space); Too Many Inmates, Too Little Space, MIAMI HERALD, May 29, 2004, at 3B
("Crowding in the St. Lucie County Jail has led to a scramble to find more room for inmates,
some of whom are sleeping on the floor or beneath stairs and tables."); Kevin Wack, State Seeks
Fix For Squeezed Prisons, ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Feb. 25,2007, at B1 ("Prisoners are tripleand quadruple-bunked in cells.").
86. See HARRISON & BECK, supra note 21, at 7 ("At year[-]end 2005, ... 23 States and the
Federal prison system reported operating at 100% or more of their highest capacity.").
87. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 806 (2005)
("Prison capacity can be stretched only so far before the courts intervene .... "); Susanna Y.
Chung, Note, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations,
68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2351, 2351-52 (2000) ("Rising inmate populations have produced
overcrowded prisons, as cells originally designed for one inmate now accommodate two or
three prisoners each[,] ... [and] inmates have increasingly brought suits against prisons .... ").
88. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 340, 352 (1981) (unsuccessfully
challenging the practice of "double-ceiling"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 (1979)
(upholding double-ceiling of pre-trial detainees).
89. See Chung, supra note 87, at 2355; see also Carla I. Barrett, Note, Does the Prison
Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the Problems Posed by Prison Overcrowding? If Not,
What Will?, 39 NEw ENG. L. REv. 391, 392-93 (2005). Congress has attempted to address the
sexual assault problem by passing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. See 42 U.S.C. §
15601-15609 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). Yet, prison rape remains a rampant national problem.
See Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of Character, 91 IOWA
L. REv. 561, 606 (2006) (describing the new Act as a "modest" start towards reform).
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Unlike the areas of substantive criminal law and excessive punishments,
the Supreme Court has not taken an entirely hands-off approach to the
problem of prison conditions. 90 Beginning primarily in the 1960s, the lower
federal courts began to conclude that certain prison conditions were so
egregious as to violate the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause. 91 While the lower federal courts were ahead of the
Supreme Court in attacking egregious conditions, the high Court eventually
followed suit. 92 In the notable case of Hutto v. Finney, the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional prison conditions in which as many as ten inmates
were confined to unfurnished, "vandalized," eight-by-ten-foot cells for
"months" while being given inadequate food and being punished with
leather straps and electrical shocks. 93
Thus, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the federal courts, with the support
of the Supreme Court, were actively supervising prison overcrowding
through injunctions and court decrees. 94 Interestingly, some wardens and
corrections officials welcomed the litigation because federal court

90. Prior to the 1960s, the Court was extremely reluctant to provide any relief for claims
of poor prison conditions. See Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An
Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DETROIT C. L. REv. 795, 795-98; Ira
P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial
Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211-13 (1980).
91. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although this
Court has never before considered what prison conditions constitute 'cruel and unusual
punishment' within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, such questions have been addressed
repeatedly by the lower courts." (citation omitted)); see also Robbins, supra note 90, at 214 ("In
short, although the Supreme Court had not yet pronounced the death sentence upon the handsoff doctrine, the lower federal courts were beginning to assume its eventual demise."); Russell
W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter, Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for
Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1339, 1344-45 (1992) ("In 1978,
the Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney joined the lower courts in condemning unconstitutional
prison conditions by upholding a district court's order to reform a prison.").
92. For the definitive account, see generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN,
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S
PRISONS (1991). By 1981, Justice Brennan was able to point to court decisions in more than two
dozen states "in which prisons or prison systems ha[ d] been placed under court order because of
conditions of confinement." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
93. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 n.4, 683 n.5, 684 (1978). For the lengthy
background story about prison conditions in Hutto that never made it into the Supreme Court's
opinion, see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 92, at 59-73.
94. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 142 ("[B]y 1986 forty-six states and U.S.
territories were either under court order or involved in litigation concerning prison conditions
likely to result in court orders.").
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intervention slowed the flow of inmates into their facilities and mandated
better, safer prisons. 95
The judiciary's involvement resulted in enormous improvements to
prisons. 96 As Professor Margo Schlanger has recently observed:
Among the areas affected were staffing, the amount of space per
inmate, medical and mental health care, food, hygiene, sanitation,
disciplinary procedures, conditions in disciplinary segregation,
exercise, fire safety, inmate classification, grievance policies, race
discrimination, sex discrimination, religious discrimination and
accommodations,
and
disability
discrimination
and
accommodations-in short, nearly all aspects of prison and jail
life, with the notable (if not quite universal) exceptions of
education, custody level, and rehabilitative programming and
employment. 97

Yet, while the federal judiciary has fostered enormous improvements in
prison and jail conditions through structural reform litigation, the
conventional wisdom is that the period of rigorous judicial reform of
prisons is over or, at minimum, substantially decreased. 98 And with the
judiciary's most rigorous period of reform behind it, it is noteworthy that
the Supreme Court passed up the opportunity to attack the core problem of
overcrowding. In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court rejected a challenge to
"double-ceiling" of prisoners because it did not lead to "deprivations of
essential food, medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence
95. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 550, 562-63 (2006) ("Prison and jail officials were
frequently collaborators in the litigation. If they did not precisely invite it, they often did not
contest it. And as I and others have observed, the remedies in the cases, frequently designed at
least in part by the defendants themselves, very much served what at least some of those
defendants saw as their interests: increasing their budgets, controlling their inmate populations,
and encouraging the professionalization of their workforces and the bureaucratization of their
organizations."); see also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 142 ("[T]he federal judge who
orders such reforms is the natural ally of correctional administrators.").
96. Some scholars are more skeptical about the benefits of judicial intervention. For the
most important work, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 305-14 ( 1991 ).
97. Schlanger, supra note 95, at 563-64.
98. See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 92, at 46-47 ("Since the late 1980s, the decline
of momentum in prison conditions litigation has been abundantly evident. ... Although the
Supreme Court was not a leader in creating the judicial prison reform effort, it has proved to be
a leader in the retrenchment process."); Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REv.
519, 525 (2004) ('"[S]tructural injunctions' have receded from the remedial scene."); Myriam
Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops ... It's Still Moving!, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161-63 (2003). I refer to these views as the "conventional wisdom"
because, as Professor Margo Schlanger argues, "reports of the death of the structural reform
injunction are greatly exaggerated." Schlanger, supra note 95, at 567 (capitalization omitted).
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among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement."99 The Court made clear that the "Constitution does not
mandate comfortable prisons," 100 thus signaling that overcrowding alone
would be insufficient to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. 101
Moreover, in post-Rhodes decisions, the Court has heightened the standards
to prove unconstitutional prison conditions. 102 For instance, the Court's
1991 decision in Wilson v. Seiter demanded proof that poor prison
conditions were the result of wanton behavior by prison officials, which in a
typical situation amounts to "'deliberate indifference."' 103 Thus, while the
judiciary's role in cleaning up egregious prison conditions has been
substantial, and structural reform litigation continues to flourish in some
areas, it is likewise clear that the Supreme Court has no appetite for
eliminating the core problem of prison overcrowding except when it
manifests itself in other appalling conditions.
In sum, the judiciary will not provide relief for our nation's mass
imprisonment problem. Accordingly, I now turn to the question of whether
legislatures and government bureaucracy can provide relief. 104
III.

A.

AN INFORMATIONAL APPROACH TO REDUCING INCARCERATION

Reducing Incarceration at the Margins Through Information Flow

Because significant power in the criminal justice system is held by
prosecutors who have the authority to charge, plea bargain, and dismiss

99. Rhodes v. Champan, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 543 (1979) (upholding double-ceiling of pre-trial detainees).
100. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
101. See William C. Collins, The Defense Perspective on Prison-Condition Cases, in
PRISONERS AND THE LAW 7-7 (Ira I. Robbins ed., 1985).
102. See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 639, 719 (1993).
103. 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-.QS (1976)).
104. As Professor Darryl Brown has explained, "the failure of judicial regulation in
criminal justice" is increasingly leading scholars to "turn toward strategies of executive-branchbased regulation for criminal justice." See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal
Law, 92 CAL. L. REv. 323, 331-32 (2004). Professor Brown argues for a statute or at least
written in-house guidelines designed to encourage prosecutors to focus on criminal justice costs
beyond retribution and deterrence. See id. at 352-58. He argues that such a proposal could lead
to improvement while still being plausible because it does not require "substantial legislative
action or dramatic shifts in constitutional doctrine." Id. at 371. My proposal is far less ambitious
than Professor Brown's-it does not propose a new statute or any noticeable action by
legislators-and is therefore more likely to avoid any type of"soft-on-crime" label.
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cases, 105 it makes sense to focus on prosecutors as a mechanism for reducing
mass imprisonment. 106 Yet, as explained above, the Supreme Court has little
interest in restricting prosecutorial discretion, and state legislators standing
for reelection are unlikely to pass legislation that explicitly reduces
prosecutors' authority to handle serious criminal activity. Accordingly, I
offer a more modest proposal that relies on government bureaucracy and
social psychology to influence prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining
decisions.
My proposal calls on state bureaucracies, in particular the states' bureaus
of prisons, to undertake an informational campaign to advise county
prosecutors about state incarceration rates and prison overcrowding. 107 The
information should convey key information that is likely to influence
prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining decisions, such as: ( 1) the total
number of incarcerated prisoners; (2) the increase (or decrease) in the
number of prisoners from previous years; (3) what percentage of the prisons
are full (i.e. whether operating capacity has been exceeded); and (4)
whether any prisons in the state are under a court order regarding prison
overcrowding. The information would be sent monthly to every prosecutor
in the state and would read something like this:
TO:
John Q. Smith, Springfield County Assistant District Attorney
FROM:
The Bureau of Prisons
RE:
Prison Overcrowding
105. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
L. REv. 1409, 1414 (2003) ("Given the huge amount of discretion that American criminal
codes (and sentencing systems) grant to prosecutors, the intentions of the prosecutor can matter
more than the facts or law relevant to the case."); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to
Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469, 479-81 (1996) (explaining why "prosecutors
enjoy de facto criminal law-making power").
I 06. See Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About
Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. REv. 621, 697-700 (2004) (explaining that we have "a system in which
many observers believe that almost all of the power resides in the hands of the executive and its
agent, the prosecutor" and that the Apprendi doctrine's focus on jury sentencing actually has the
effect of handing more power to prosecutors).
107. Over a decade ago, Professor Robert Misner offered a bolder proposal in which a state
agency would determine the amount of state prison capacity, that prison space would be
allocated to counties on an ex ante basis, and prosecutors would not be permitted to use more
space than allocated. Misner, supra note 9, at 720-21. If a county used less than its allocated
resources, it would reap a windfall to spend on education or other matters. /d. By contrast, if a
county used more resources than allocated, then it would be required to use its own money to
purchase additional prison space from the state or another jurisdiction. See id. Unfortunately, no
legislature has adopted Professor Misner's proposal for dealing with the diffusion of
responsibility between county prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining decisions on the one
hand and state funding of incarceration on the other. Unlike Professor Misner's approach, mine
would not require any systematic changes to the criminal justice system and therefore may have
a better chance of occurring.
STAN.
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As of June 30, 2007, there were 25,870 persons incarcerated in prisons
throughout the state. The state prisons are operating at 103% of their
capacity. There are 507 more prisoners incarcerated in state prisons than
on this date one year ago.
Number o(Prisoners Prison Operating Capacity
Dec. 31, 2006
Dec. 31, 2005
Dec. 31, 2004

25,870
25,363
24,886108

103%
102%
101%

Of the State's 26 prisons, 6 are currently under a court order or consent
decree to deal with overcrowding or other conditions of confinement. 109
As you know, prosecutors can have a significant impact in reducing
prison overcrowding because judges give great weight to prosecutors'
sentencing recommendations.
The proposal will not drastically change how prosecutors charge,
dismiss, or plea bargain cases. 110 Presented with a murder case, prosecutors
will not decline to charge suspects simply because they are well versed in
the overcrowding of their state's prisons. Faced with an aggravated assault,
prosecutors will not seek probation instead of prison time. Incarceration will
still be the first weapon of choice for prosecutors, and they will likely
dispense it in roughly the same number of cases and in roughly the same
amounts as they would have in the absence of incarceration information
108. These numbers are generated based on data compiled by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics through 2004. At the end of 2004, there were 1,244,311 prisoners in state prisons
throughout the United States. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 210677,
PRISONERS IN 2004,
at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf. Divided by the fifty states, the average state
prison population was 24,866. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that prison populations
grew at 2.6% per year during the period from 1995 through 2004. See id. Using this rate, I
calculated the hypothetical state's prison population in 2005 and 2006.
109. These numbers are offered as a general example, but they do bear relation to the
general incarceration story in the United States. In 2000, the last year for which the Bureau of
Justice Statistics conducted a census on the issue, 324 of the 1320 state prisons in the United
States were under a court order or consent decree. See STEPHEN & KARBERG, supra note 38, at
iv, 9. Averaged among the 50 states, this amounts to 26.4 prisons per state with 6.5 prisons
under court orders or consent decrees.
110. See Misner, supra note 9, at 763 ("The American criminal justice system does not
respond well to suggestions for fundamental change.").
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from the Bureau of Prisons. Yet, while additional information will not foster
drastic behavioral changes, it is quite possible that it could change behavior
at the margins, particularly with respect to nonviolent criminals who make
up roughly half of the nation's prisoners. 111
For example, imagine that a hypothetical prosecutor is willing to offer a
plea bargain carrying a nineteen-month sentence for a run-of-the-mill
nonviolent criminal charged with drug possession. 112 Now imagine the
prosecutor is advised of prison overcrowding before making the deal.
Obviously, the prosecutor will still charge the defendant and will still want
to ensure that he serves a serious prison term. However, instead of offering
a bottom-line deal of nineteen months, perhaps the prosecutor will offer
seventeen months because, in the back of her mind, she is thinking about
prison overcrowding.
This two month decrease, alone, will not even be noticeable in a country
that has more than two-million people behind bars. But changes at the
margins can have a big effect when multiplied by thousands of criminal
defendants each year. If the two month effect occurs in thousands of cases
throughout the country it will result in a noticeable (though still not
dramatic) decrease in incarceration over time. 113
To visualize the idea, think of mass imprisonment as a bubble that is
about to burst. The goal is not to drain all or even half the air out of the
balloon but, instead, to leak a little air out of the balloon so that it is no
longer on the verge of bursting. Importantly, the proposal does not require
prosecutors to do anything. Instead, it provides prosecutors with a picture of
the overinflated balloon and signals to them that they can leak some of the
air out if they want to depressurize the situation.

B.

Supporting Evidence from Social Psychology Literature

Although it is impossible to say for certain whether an informational
campaign would have any effect on prosecutors' charging decisions, there is
a body of social psychology literature that gives cause for optimism.
111. See supra text accompanying note 26.
112. The average drug possession sentence in federal court is about nineteen months. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbi.S .31 (2003).
113. Of course, as Professor Kevin Reitz has recently demonstrated, raw incarceration
numbers will rise before they diminish, even assuming that there is zero incarceration growth in
future years. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 1788-89. The reason is attributable to the lengthy
sentences that have been handed down in recent years. !d. As Professor Reitz explains, we must
think not just in terms of the number of people incarcerated, but also based on the number of
"person-years" of confmement that are handed down. !d. In the long-run however, my proposal
will reduce "person-years."
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As countless media studies have demonstrated, people are susceptible to
suggestion on a huge variety of issues, not the least of which is crime and
criminal justice policy." 4 Social psychologists have long posited that
increases in knowledge and persuasive efforts can affect attitudes and
behavior. 115 This should not be surprising, considering that corporations
spend billions of dollars on advertising and that the government makes
frequent use of public service announcements.
To evaluate whether prosecutors can be influenced by an informational
campaign, one can consider social psychologists' studies which have found
that public health messages can influence behavior. 116 For example,
researchers who provided beach-goers with a brochure detailing the benefits
of wearing sunscreen found that those individuals were more likely to
request a free bottle of sunscreen. 117 In another experiment, researchers
found that women who received a message encouraging them to take
responsibility for detecting breast cancer were more likely to obtain a
mammogram during the following year. 118 Similarly, when smokers

114. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 45, at 442 ("[T]he media's emphasis on crime makes the
issue more salient in the minds of viewers and readers, which causes the public to perceive
crime as a more severe problem than real world figures indicate.").
115. See, e.g., Leandre R. Fabrigar et al., Understanding Knowledge Effects on AttitudeBehavior Consistency: The Role of Relevance, Complexity, and Amount of Knowledge, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 556, 557 (2006) ("One reason researchers have been interested
in knowledge is that it has long been assumed that increases in knowledge are associated with
greater influence of attitudes on behavior.").
116. See, e.g., Alexander J. Rothman et al., The Systematic Influence of Gain- and LossFramed Messages on Interest in and Use of Different Types of Health Behavior, 25
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1355, 1356 (1999) ("[S]tudies have similarly observed
that providing people with loss-framed information is an effective way to promote the
performance of or preferences for mammography, HN -testing, amniocentesis, skin cancer
examinations, and blood-cholesterol screening." (citations and footnote omitted)).
117. Jerusha B. Detweiler et al., Message Framing and Sunscreen Use: Gain-Framed
Messages Motivate Beach-Goers, 18 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 189, 193 (1999) ("[T]here was a
significant gain-frame advantage in promoting intentions among beach-goers who had no prior
intention to use sunscreen.").
118. See Alexander J. Rothman et al., Attributions of Responsibility and Persuasion:
Increasing Mammography Utilization Among Women over 40 with an Internally Oriented
Message, 12 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 39, 45 (1993) ("[O]nly women who viewed the internal
presentation were reliably more likely to obtain a mammogram than the average eligible woman
in Connecticut."); see also Sara M. Banks et al., The Effects of Message Framing on
Mammography Utilization, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 178, 178 (1995) (finding that women who
were not adhering to mammography screening guidelines were more likely to have a
mammogram within one year after being exposed to messages about the risks of not obtaining a
mammogram); Celette Sugg Skinner et al., Physicians' Recommendations for Mammography:
Do Tailored Messages Make a Difference?, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 43, 43 (1994) (fmding that
recipients of tailored letters were more likely to seek mammograms).
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received letters from physicians describing the number of years of life that
would be cut short if they did not quit, the subjects reduced smoking. 119
An attempt to influence prosecutorial decision making would be akin to
a public health campaign to reduce skin cancer, breast cancer, or
smoking. 12° For decades, public service announcements have had some
success at shaping behavior. 121 And social psychology teaches us that there
are a host of effective tactics that can be employed in a campaign to
influence prosecutors.
First, social psychologists have demonstrated that information conveyed
in written texts can have persuasive impact. 122 Unlike visual or verbal
messages, which go by quickly and sometimes force the audience to focus
on peripheral cues such as the credibility of the person conveying the
message, written texts offer readers the opportunity to review the message
carefully at their own pace. 123 Thus, more complicated messages are
119. See Dawn K. Wilson eta!., Compliance to Health Recommendations: A Theoretical
Overview of Message Framing, 3 HEALTH Eouc. REs. 161, 167 (1988); see also Nathan
Maccoby et a!., Reducing the Risk of Cardiovascular Disease: Effects of a Community-Based
Campaign on Knowledge and Behavior, 3 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 100, 110-14 (1977)
(explaining how a media campaign about cardiovascular disease led to positive behavioral
changes, including decreased smoking).
120. As with teen smoking public service announcements, it might also be useful to aim the
message at younger "junior" prosecutors early in their careers. Psychologists have demonstrated
that the amount of information a person has about an issue "is a determinant of the extent of
attitude change following exposure to new information or to a counterattitudinal
communication." Andrew R. Davidson eta!., Amount of Information About the Attitude Object
and Attitude-Behavior Consistency, 49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1184, 1185 (1985);
see also Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion
Variables, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 323 (D.T. Gilbert et a!. eds., 4th ed.
1998) (explaining that the degree of difference between the advocated behavior and the
individual's actual behavior affects motivation to comply with the message being advocated).
Thus, for an informational campaign aimed at prosecutors to have maximum effect, it should
reach junior prosecutors as early as possible, before their attitudes toward incarceration are too
fmnly set.
121. See RICHARD M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION: COMMUNICATIONS AND
ATTITUDES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 322 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining that state anti-smoking
campaigns have been effective).
122. See, e.g., P. Karen Murphy et a!., Examining the Complex Roles of Motivation and
Text Medium in the Persuasion Process, 30 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 418, 425-26, 434
(2005) (explaining that "the education and persuasion literature would indicate that traditional
written texts are more persuasive than other modes of delivery," but finding in a study of
college students that "differences in the mode of delivery ... [of] texts ... have little bearing on
changes in students' beliefs").
123. See Loraine Devos-Comby & Peter Salovey, Applying Persuasion Strategies to Alter
HIV-Relevant Thoughts and Behavior, 6 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 287, 300 (2002) ("Self-paced
communications [such as written texts] lead to greater message scrutiny, whereas externally
paced messages, because they provide visual prompts, increase the impact of peripheral
persuasion cues such as communicator credibility and likeableness.").
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sometimes easier to convey in writing. 124 Indeed, industries that have been
foreclosed from television and radio advertising-notably tobacco
manufacturers-have continued to enjoy success through print
advertising. 125 The fact that the Bureau of Prisons would reach prosecutors
through a written memorandum should not preclude the information from
being effective.
Second, the manner in which the written text is conveyed is important.
Information is more likely to be effective if it is tailored in a personal
fashion. 126 The note that the sample memorandum in Part liLA is therefore
addressed by name to "John Q. Smith, Springfield County Assistant District
Attorney," rather than generically to all county prosecutors. Additionally,
note that the memorandum is approximately 130 words, covers less than
half-a-page of text, and features a very simple chart. 127 Researchers have
demonstrated that written text that is shorter and easier to comprehend is
likely to have a greater impact. 128
Third, note that the last paragraph of the memorandum encourages
prosecutors to take personal responsibility for the incarceration problem and
frames the issue positively by focusing on reduction of the mass
imprisonment problem: "As you know, prosecutors can have a significant
impact in reducing prison overcrowding because judges give great weight
to prosecutors' sentencing recommendations. " 129 Scholars have discovered
that messages encouraging personal responsibility can be particularly
124. See William J. McGuire, Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 233, 283 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985) (stating that
written texts have more effect on attitudes); Shelly Chaiken & Alice H. Eagly, Communication
Modality as a Determinant of Message Persuasiveness and Message Comprehensibility, 34 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 605, 605 (1976) (finding that persuasion and comprehension of
difficult messages were greater with written materials, but for easy messages videotape was
more persuasive than written texts).
125. See HERBERT W. SIMONS WITH JOANNE MORREALE & BRUCE GRONBECK, PERSUASION
IN SOCIETY 93 {200 1).
126. See Pablo Brinol & Richard E. Petty, Fundamental Processes Leading to Attitude
Change: Implications for Cancer Prevention Communications, 56 J. COMM. S81, S83-84
(2006) ("[B]y increasing the personal relevance of a message, people scrutinize the evidence
more carefully such that if the evidence is found to be strong, more attitude change results
. . . ."). As scholars have explained, "[t]ailored information is more likely to be read,
remembered, and perceived as more relevant than comparison communications." Devos-Comby
& Salovey, supra note 123, at 296; see also Skinner et a!., supra note 118, at 45 (finding in
mammography stu4y that "tailored letter recipients were significantly more likely to read more
of the content" and that the "letters were more likely to be remembered"). With hundreds or
thousands of prosecutors in each state it is, of course, difficult to tailor information.
127. See ELIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 265 {2d ed. 2000)
("[T]he golden rule for most media persuasion is: Keep it simple.").
128. See id.; Brinol & Petty, supra note 126, at S84.
129. See supra Part liLA.
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effective when they are framed as a creating a "gain." 130 In particular, "gainframed" messages are most effective when the suggested action appears to
involve little or no risk. 131 Because offering a marginally lower prison
sentence would be a low risk behavior for most prosecutors, a "gainframed" message would likely be most successful in encouraging that
behavior. 132
Fourth, the reference to statistics about the number of persons
incarcerated, the increase in incarceration over the last year, and the percent
of operating capacity, is also likely to be influential. 133 Although scholars
debate the persuasive influence of statistics, some studies have found them
to be more persuasive than narrative evidence. 134
Fifth, even if prosecutors fail to read the full one-page document, the
subject line-"Prison Overcrowding" 135-might still have persuasive
force. 136 The short subject line clearly conveys a strong message to
prosecutors, even if they read no further.
Finally, there is the question ofhow often to distribute the message to the
prosecutors. Research demonstrates that surprising messages are more
likely to have an effect. 137 And researchers also have found that subjects are

130. See Peter Salovey et al., Message Framing in the Prevention and Early Detection of
Illness, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 391, 391-97
(James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) (discussing literature).
131. Anne Marie Apanovitch et al., Using Message Framing to Motivate HIV Testing
Among Low-Income, Ethnic Minority Women, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 60, 60 (2003) ("[G]ainframed messages are most persuasive for behaviors with relatively certain outcomes."); DevosComby & Salovey, supra note 123, at 292 ("Loss frames are more persuasive when individuals
consider behavioral decisions that they perceive as risky or uncertain, and gain frames are more
effective in promoting [action] when they are seen as involving little or no risk.").
132. See, e.g., Apanovitch et al., supra note 131, at 65 ("As predicted, we found that among
those women who viewed HIV testing as having a certain outcome (with a low risk of testing
positive), gain-framed messages better encouraged self-reported HIV testing than loss-framed
messages .... ").
133. See SMITH & MACKIE, supra note 127, at 264 ("[M]any people are particularly
impressed by speeches or advertisements that contain numbers, graphs, or equations, perhaps
because they convey an air of scientific objectivity.").
134. See Rodney A. Reynolds & J. Lynn Reynolds, Evidence, in THE PERSUASION
HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 427, 431 (James Price Dillard &
Michael Pfau eds., 2002) ("On balance, statistical evidence would seem to be the more
persuasive form of evidence when compared to narrative evidence, but such effects will depend
on the type and amount of cognitive processing of the evidence.").
135. See supra Part liLA.
136. See DAVID 0GJLVY, CONFESSIONS OF AN ADVERTISING MAN 104 (1963) ("On the
average, five times as many people read the headline as read the body copy.").
137. See Sara M. Baker & Richard E. Petty, Majority and Minority Influence: SourcePosition Imbalance as a Determinant of Message Scrutiny, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1994) (finding that receiving unexpected information stimulates message
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more likely to be persuaded through repetition, 138 but that persuasion wears
out at a certain point. 139 Although there is no defmitive correct answer, I
propose that the bureaucracy strike the balance between repetition and
saturation by sending the imprisonment information once per month as well
as whenever a prison milestone occurs. Milestones would include ( 1) a new
prison being subjected to a court order or consent decree; (2) prisons
exceeding 100% capacity for the first time; or (3) whenever a 1000
increment of prisoners is reached for the first time-for example, when
occupancy increases from 26,999 inmates to 27,000 prisoners.

C.

Potential Objections and Responses

There are a number of objections and problems that could stand in the
way of using incarceration information to push for a marginal decrease in
imprisonment. In particular, prosecutors might offer inconsistent sentences
to similarly situated defendants due to the timing of when they receive
notice of the incarceration information. Similarly, there might be an
inconsistency if some prosecutors remain unpersuaded by the imprisonment
information, while other prosecutors in the same jurisdiction are persuaded
to seek lower (or possibly even higher) sentences as a result of the
information. While there is some merit to these objections, I do not believe
they defeat the proposal.

processing); Stephen M. Smith & Richard E. Petty, Message Framing and Persuasion: A
Message Processing Analysis, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 257, 265 (1996).
138. See ANTHONY R. PRATKANIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, AGE OF PROPAGANDA: THE
EVERYDAY USE AND ABUSE OF PERSUASION 181 (2001) (discussing studies demonstrating that
"all other things being equal, the more a person is exposed to an item the more attractive it is");
Xinshu Zhao, A Variable-Based Typology and a Review of Advertising-Related Persuasion
Research During the 1990s, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 495, 503 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) (reviewing studies that
found higher recall of television advertisements that had run more often).
139. See John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, Central and Peripheral Routes to
Persuasion: The Role of Message Repetition, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND ADVERTISING
EFFECTS 91, 96-97 (Linda F. Alwitt & Andrew A. Mitchell eds., 1985) ("The most common
empirical finding in the area of message repetition is that persuasion first increases then wears
out as the number of repetitions increases."); Gerald J. Com & Marvin E. Goldberg, Children's
Responses to Repetitive Television Commercials, 6 J. CONSUMER REs. 421,424 (1980) (finding
that children who saw a commercial three times preferred the product more than children who
saw the same commercial one or five times).
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Inconsistencies Among Prosecutors

At the outset, critics might suggest that even if an informational
campaign could influence prosecutors, it would do so inconsistently. Some
prosecutors might be willing to offer better plea bargains after reading the
imprisonment information, while other prosecutors would be unaffected by
the information. While there is almost certainly some truth to this charge, it
proves too much. There is already significant variation in the plea bargains
that prosecutors offer to similarly situated defendants. 140 While most
prosecutors' offices have a "going rate" for common crimes-for example,
an unwritten policy that most second-time DWI offenders receive a thirtyday jail sentence-the reality of charge and sentence bargaining already
permits wide variations. 141 One prosecutor can offer a thirty-day sentence,
while the prosecutor in the court next door can offer fifteen days. The more
lenient prosecutor might be willing to plead the defendant down to a
reckless driving charge carrying a probated sentence, whereas the tougher
prosecutor might demand a guilty plea to the original DWI charge. The
possible reasons underlying these variations are endless. Apart from the
facts of the cases at hand, one prosecutor might have been influenced by a
recent newspaper article about a drunk driver who killed a family; 142 one
assistant district attorney might have been raised by a stricter family than
the other; or one prosecutor might believe that she can strengthen her
reputation and promotion prospects by demanding tougher plea bargains. 143
The key point is that information asymmetries and life experience
already work variations in the charge and sentencing bargains offered by
different prosecutors. So long as rigid guidelines are not imposed on
prosecutors, 144 those variations will always exist. To be sure, providing
140. See Wright & Miller, supra note 105, at 1411 ("Charge bargaining also gives
individual prosecutors (especially those in large, overworked offices) too much opportunity to
treat similarly situated defendants differently depending on whether they plead guilty or go to a
trial."); see also Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 934-35 (2006) (discussing ways in which prosecutors and other
participants in the criminal justice system manipulate plea bargaining and dismissal powers to
serve their own interests).
141. See Bibas, supra note 140, at 957.
142. For example, consider the recent front-page story in the Houston Chronicle detailing
how an individual with three prior drunk driving convictions killed a woman and her pregnant
daughter. See Cindy Horswell & Renee C. Lee, Suspect in Fatal Crash Had 3 DWI Convictions,
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 28, 2007, at 1.
143. Consider also the possibility of"holiday," "weekend," or "vacation" specials, whereby
prosecutors might offer marginally better plea deals to clear the dockets during times when
judges, court staff, and lawyers would prefer not to be bogged down with trials.
144. See Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1262-65 (2004) (expressing concern about the enormous sentencing power
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prosecutors with imprisonment statistics will certainly affect some
prosecutors more than others. However, unlike many variables which touch
only certain actors, an informational campaign focused on mass
imprisonment at least starts from a position where all prosecutors are privy
to the same information.
2.

The Problem of Dissipating Benefits

Critics might also argue that even if a critical mass of prosecutors could
be influenced by an informational campaign, any benefit from the
imprisonment information would dissipate over time as prosecutors forget
about the information or as they become over-saturated and ignore it. Once
again, there is some obvious truth to this criticism. It is logical to expect
that prosecutors might be more willing to offer better plea bargains in the
.hours or days after receiving the overcrowding information than many
weeks thereafter. 145 Similarly, as memoranda about prison statistics arrive
month after month, it seems likely that prosecutors will be influenced by
them less and less, in the same way that consumers learn to tune out
advertisements that appear too often. 146 Nevertheless, while these objections
have merit, they should not be overstated.
Even if an informational campaign only leads prosecutors to decrease
their charge and sentencing bargains for a few months, it may nevertheless
create significant long-term benefits by reducing the baseline sentence for
some crimes. For example, imagine that the unwritten "going rate" in a
local prosecutor's office for a drug possession charge is twenty-four
months. Under that going rate, prosecutors sometimes give sentences as low
as twenty months or as high as twenty-eight months, but most plea deals are
for twenty-four-month sentences. Now assume that the overcrowding
information leads a number of prosecutors to reduce their sentencing
recommendations for drug possession charges. Instead of occasionally
giving a twenty-month sentence, prosecutors over a period of time begin to
regularly (though certainly not always) give twenty-month plea deals.
Without intending to do so, those prosecutors may reset the baseline by

held by prosecutors under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but explaining that full-scale
reform is unlikely).
145. See Cacioppo & Petty, supra note 139; but see Banks et al., supra note 118, at 178
(finding that a loss-framed message about breast cancer influenced women to obtain a
mammogram up to a year after receiving the message).
146. See generally Caioppo & Petty, supra note 139.
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making twenty months the going rate for drug possession charges. Thus,
even if prosecutors decline to keep lowering sentences for drug possession
(and other crimes) below twenty months as further incarceration
information is provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the prosecutors will
already have taken steps that will reduce mass imprisonment well into the
future.
Of course, for the informational campaign to have maximum effect, it
would be preferable if prosecutors did not quickly begin to ignore the
imprisonment information after receiving it. Recognizing that there is a
saturation point at which the persuasiveness of information declines, there
are steps that can be taken to keep the information at its maximum potency.
First, rather than sending the imprisonment information on the same day of
every month, the Bureau of Prisons might "mix it up" to ensure that the
information updates arrive somewhat irregularly. 148 Second, in addition to
sending a monthly information update, the Bureau of Prisons might also
send extra documentation, packaged in a different color envelope, whenever
milestones are struck. For instance, each time an additional 1000 people are
incarcerated or every time prison population increases by one percent, the
Bureau of Prisons might send prosecutors an additional informational letter.
And by packaging the letter in a different colored envelope-for instance,
the Bureau of Prisons could send a red envelope each time the prison
population reaches another 1000 person milestone-prosecutors wpuld be
aware of the milestone even if they failed to open or read the letter (so long
as they knew the significance of the red envelopes).
3.

Will Prosecutors Ignore the Information?

A third objection to an informational campaign is that the vast majority
of prosecutors would be unaffected by an informational campaign because
they already know of prison overcrowding or because, even if informed, it
simply would not affect their plea bargaining decisions.
While prosecutors are generally aware of prison overcrowding, at present
they do not pay much attention to the problem on a daily basis. As
Professors Zirnring and Hawkins explained in their landmark book on
American incarceration, "[t]o judges and prosecutors imprisonment may
seem to be available as a free good or service"-the equivalent of a

147. See Brown, supra note 104, at 370 (arguing for cost-benefit analysis in criminal law
and suggesting that it could "gradually contribute to a change in prosecutorial culture").
148. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting the benefit of surprising messages).
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"correctional free lunch." 149 Prosecutors simply do not give much thought to
prison capacity when they are standing face to face with criminal
defendants.
The more vexing question is what prosecutors would do if they were
regularly forced to contemplate the realities of mass imprisonment. Some
local prosecutors might well disclaim any responsibility to decrease their
sentencing recommendations. They might contend that the State enacts the
criminal laws and that the State alone bears responsibility for finding
enough prison beds to house all those who have violated the laws. Local
prosecutors might contend that their job requires them to enforce the exact
letter of the criminal laws, regardless of prison overcrowding. While this
contention sounds lofty, it ultimately rings hollow. 150
The very existence of plea bargaining suggests that prosecutors could not
enforce the exact letter of the criminal law in all cases through trials and
maximum sentences. 151 Even the most junior prosecutor recognizes that
without charge and sentencing bargaining, their courts, as currently run,
would grind to a halt. 152 As Judge Gerald Lynch has explained, because of
the limited resources of the criminal justice system, "prosecutorial decisions
149. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 140, 211; see also William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REv. 781, 838-39 (2006) ("Because
state rather than local taxpayers pay for prison beds, local prosecutors tend to 'spend' those beds
more readily than they should.").
150. A less "lofty" assessment might be that prosecutors see themselves primarily as
advocates, not as problem-solvers. See Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1125, 1173 (2005) ("Many prosecutors express ambivalence-or even downright
hostility-about having to fulfill the problem-solver role themselves. . . . [S]ome prosecutors
explicitly deny any interest in handling the non-advocacy or social work components of the job
.... ").
.
151. See Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2117, 213 7 ( 1998) ("[P]rosecutors must exercise judgment about which of the many cases
that are technically covered by the criminal law are really worthy of criminal punishment.").
152. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 867 (2000)
(describing plea bargaining as a "marvelously efficient relief from a suffocating workload");
Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code
on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1935, 1949 (2006) ("District
Attorneys must economize, selecting their highest priority cases to receive the most time and
resources from their limited budgets, while the bulk of cases must be resolved without the
expense of a trial."). A handful of jurisdictions have attempted to eliminate plea bargaining,
with mixed success. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REv. 695,
707--09 (2001) (discussing efforts in Alaska, California, Texas, and Arizona); Michael L.
Rubinstein & Teresa J. White, Plea Bargaining: Can Alaska Live Without It?, 62 JUDICATURE
266 (1978) (discussing Alaska's attempts to eliminate plea bargains). Of course, as Albert
Alschuler has argued, society could abandon plea bargaining if it simply decided to spend the
money necessary to fully staff courts to handle more trials. See Albert N. Alschuler,

Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining
System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931,937-48 (1983).
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inevitably combine judgments of desert with judgments of resources
allocation." 153 Indeed, in many instances, prosecutors are eager to engage in
charge or sentencing bargaining to avoid the harsh results of mandatory
minimum statutes or instances where the statutory punishments for the
charged crime are not a good fit for the actual conduct at hand. 154
Additionally, local prosecutors could say that prison overcrowding is
"not my problem," or that "it should be the prosecutor from the neighboring
county, not me, who should scale back her sentences." That tragedy of the
commons 155 problem is a serious concern, yet it is offset by the pervasive
view of prosecutors that it is their obligation to serve a higher calling to "do
justice" or act for the public interest. 156 As such, while collective action and
tragedy of the commons concerns stand in the way, it is likely that
prosecutors will be influenced by an informational campaign. 157
153. Lynch, supra note 151, at 2139. The most overt mixing of desert and resource
allocation occurs in potentially capital cases. See Robert Morganthau, What Prosecutors Won't
Tell You, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at A25 (opposing the reinstatement of capital punishment in
New York and contending that the death penalty "drain[s] millions of dollars from more
promising efforts to restore safety to our lives").
154. See Wright & Engen, supra note 152, at 1978 (offering empirical evidence
demonstrating that "the crimes for which the guidelines mandate active prison sentences are the
ones that are most likely to result in substantial charge reductions"). Wright & Engen's research
offers one of the few empirical demonstrations that prosecutors and defense attorneys will agree
on substantial reductions when there are numerous lesser-included (and other) offenses that can
be pleaded to in the criminal code. See id. at 1938-39 ("We compare the initial felony charges
that prosecutors filed with the charges at the time of conviction and ... [t]he evidence shows
that charge reductions are common, occurring in roughly half of all felony cases that resulted in
conviction and that the choice to reduce criminal charges has a large effect on average sentence
severity.").
155. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968),
available at http://sciencernag.org/cgi/reprint/ 162/3859/1243 .pdf.
156. See William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices, and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT'G REP. 309, 311 (1993). Braniff, a longtime United States Attorney,
states that "[t]he U.S. Attorney, as a representative of the President, has the unique
responsibility of establishing prosecutorial policy. He or she is the single person in the criminal
justice system who must look to the totality of criminal threats within the district, as well as the
available resources to meet those threats, and fashion a prosecution response that maximizes the
positive impact that can be obtained from the resources. No other person has this broad
responsibility." !d.; see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1999) ("In some sense, Southern District [of New York]
prosecutors felt that they owned the concept [of the duty to do justice]. It certainly set us apart
from the defense lawyers with whom we interacted."); Lynch, supra note 151, at 2131. See
generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309
(2001).
157. A final related objection, however, is that an informational campaign might actually
have an unanticipated backlash effect resulting in more imprisonment. See GOTTSCHALK, supra
note 22, at 238 (explaining that in the history of prison reform movements, "measures heralded
as 'reforms' often have negative, unanticipated consequences"). Specifically, an informational

HeinOnline -- 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 77 2008

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

78
IV.

[Ariz. St. L.J.

A POLITICAL FREEBIE: DECREASING INCARCERATION WITHOUT
SEEMING SOFT ON CRIME

The question often raised in opposition to reform proposals is: Why
would the legislature act? In other words, why would legislators-who take
contributions from corrections unions and benefit politically from being
tough on crime-seek to reduce incarceration by requiring that prosecutors
be advised of imprisonment data? The answer is twofold: First, legislators
are willing to make criminal justice reforms when the reforms are politically
neutral and do not raise red flags. Second, in times of tight budgets,
legislatures have much to gain by reducing corrections costs.

A.

Non-Controversial Criminal Justice Reforms Are Regularly Enacted

At the outset, I must acknowledge the obvious fact that legislators are
loath to appear soft on crime. Accordingly, reform proposals requiring
legislatures to make sweeping changes favorable to criminal defendants are
highly unlikely to be enacted. 158 Thus, if my proposal runs the risk of
exposing legislators to being labeled soft on crime, I would concede that it
is highly unlikely to be put into place.
The question, therefore, is how controversial it would be to require that
the Bureau of Prisons inform prosecutors about imprisonment levels and
confinement conditions. I would posit that the proposal would not be
controversial at all. Legislators would in no way be taking unpopular
positions such as decriminalizing behavior or reducing statutory sentencing
ranges. 159 To the contrary, legislators would be instituting a seemingly
neutral policy that prosecutors regularly receive accurate factual
information about prison capacity. To put it in real world language,

campaign could lead prosecutors to offer higher sentences on the belief that prison
overcrowding will lead to early release of criminals. It is, of course, impossible to rule out an
unanticipated backlash effect, but in this context it seems unlikely to occur. In most
jurisdictions, prosecutors are well aware of the rules governing the early release of prisoners
because such rules are integral to plea bargaining negotiations. In states with determinate
sentencing laws, prosecutors know that statutes prevent the release of prisoners before they have
served a particular percentage of their sentences. And in states with indeterminate sentencing
schemes, prosecutors are already aware, and in fact rely on, the typical ratio of credit that
prisoners receive for days served.
158. See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REv. 2021, 2041 (2006) (reviewing scholarly proposals to solve the ills
of the criminal justice system and concluding that many of them require that "Congress or state
legislators change criminal procedural rights via legislation," which appears unlikely).
159. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 507 ("[L ]egislatures regularly add to criminal codes,
but rarely subtract from them.").
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legislators would simply be requiring that one set of government workers
(bureaucrats in the Bureau of Prisons) shuffle some paperwork to another
set of government workers (the county prosecutors). 160 It is difficult to see
how the increased paper flow could be painted as soft on crime.
Indeed, the criminal justice system regularly requires that additional
paperwork be exchanged between government departments or agencies. For
example, when the FBI begins a preliminary inquiry in a "sensitive criminal
matter[ s]" such as an investigation of political corruption or malfeasance
related to a religious organization or the news media, it is obligated to
notify the relevant United States Attorney as soon as practicable. 161 If the
FBI terminates the investigation, it must notify the appropriate federal
prosecutor within thirty days. 162 And if the FBI refers a serious matter to
state or local prosecutors and they decline to prosecute, the FBI is obligated
to advise the relevant federal prosecutor in writing within thirty days. 163
Perhaps more relevant, legislatures are willing to implement "neutral"
criminal justice reforms that generate little opposition from prosecutors and
other powerful interest groups. 164 For example, legislatures occasionally
vest sentencing commissions with the power to develop prosecutorial
standards for charging and plea bargaining decisions. 165 When the
commissions then engage in non-controversial (but still useful) projects,
such as codifying preexisting prosecutorial standards, they meet little
resistance. 166 Consider also that a number of states and localities have
bucked the national trend and established salary parity between prosecutors

160. Of course, politicians often criticize each other for increasing the size of bureaucracy.
It is, however, hard to think of a state politician who has lost a major election because he

demanded that too much paper be exchanged between government agencies.
161. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S . DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATIONS 8-9 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf; see
also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 749, 814 (2003) (discussing same).
162. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 161 , at 11.
163. See id.
164. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of
Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REv. 219, 255-59 (2004) (utilizing public choice theory to
argue that criminal legislation falls into four categories, the last of which includes legislation in
which prosecutors are unlikely to dominate the legislative debate).
165. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1010, 1017-18 (2005) (discussing examples from Kansas and
Washington in which legislatures passed laws that empowered sentencing commissions to
regulate judges and prosecutors).
166. See id. at 1026-27 (calling such regulations the equivalent of"low-hanging fruit for
regulators").
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and government funded defense lawyers. 167 As Professor Ron Wright
explains, funding parity was put into place in these jurisdictions because the
legal community-including the American Bar Association, judges,
administrators, defense lawyers and many prosecutors-favor equal
salaries. 168 Essentially, the idea is not controversial enough for interest
groups and tough on crime advocates to become exercised. Additionally, as
Professor Bill Stuntz has detailed, although states practically never narrow
criminal liability, legislatures have offered criminal procedure protections
beyond those mandated by the United States Supreme Court. 169 These
include recent bans on racial profiling and legislation encouraging DNAbased innocence claims. 170 In sum, legislators are not averse to criminal
justice reforms that will not carry the soft on crime label.

B.

Budget Constraints Provide a Strong Incentive For Legislative
Action

If I am correct that ordering prosecutors to be better informed about
prison capacity would not be controversial or even noticeable to the public
at large, the next question is why legislators would bother to spend their
time implementing such a bland proposal that will not gamer headlines. The
answer is money.
While certain legislators are only interested in proposing legislation that
will bring them notoriety, many legislators are motivated by more
pedestrian concerns such as reducing governmental spending. For instance,
consider legislators who sit on appropriations committees. By virtue of
having to wallow in intricate details in search of a balanced budget,
appropriations committee members may be interested in enacting
administrative reforms that could reduce expenditures. And given the power
that comes with sitting on appropriations committees, if a member proposed

See Wright, supra note 164, at 233.
See id. at 259-60.
See Stuntz, supra note 149, at 796.
See id. at 799-800. Professor Stuntz also points out that many of the criminal
procedure protections that we think of as mandated by the judiciary-including the reasonable
doubt standard, the exclusionary rule, appointed counsel for indigents, and protection against
the third degree-were actually afforded by statute in many states well before the Warren
Court's criminal procedure revolution mandated them. See id. at 801....()2. In this regard, for a
compelling argument that five of the Warren Court's most significant criminal procedure cases
were actually quite majoritarian, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?
Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REv.
1361 (2004).
167.
168.
169.
170.
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a bill to provide more information to prosecutors, it is unlikely that other
legislators would put up much, if any, opposition. 171
When we consider that corrections expenditures cost billions of dollars
per year, 172 it is entirely possible that cost conscious legislators would
embrace the opportunity to lower costs at the margins by indirectly
influencing prosecutorial behavior. Indeed, as Professor Rachel Barkow
has catalogued, there are an abundance of recent examples where legislators
relied on fiscal concerns to make far more controversial changes to
sentencing policy:
A Michigan legislator noted that when he first introduced bills to
reduce mandatory minimum sentences, he received little support.
After a conference on the state budget, however, the governor
called him "to see how we can make these bills happen." Kansas's
decision to require treatment instead of incarceration for first-time,
nonviolent drug offenders rested in part on the fact that "those
people who favor being tough on crime don't want to find the
money to build more prisons." Washington passed its drug
treatment diversion programs, according to one expert, because
"(t]he fiscal crisis has brought together the folks who think
sentences are too long with the folks who are perfectly happy with
the sentences but think prison is costing too much." One Texas
state representative supported treatment options for drug offenders
because it was cost effective and would free prison space for more
violent offenders. Several governors have ordered the early release
of prisoners with the explicit goal of reducing correctional costs
and addressing budget crises. 173

In recent years, numerous states have sought to reduce their corrections
expenditures to save money. 174 A report by the Vera Institute of Justice
171. See Lianne Hart, Texas May Require Schools to Carry Elective on Bible: Legislation
Calls for an 'Objective and Nondevotional' Course, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, at A26
(describing the House Appropriations Committee as the second most powerful committee in the
Texas legislature); Richard G. Jones, Lawmaker in New Jersey Is Charged With Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, March 30, 2007, at B1 (describing the chair of the New Jersey Senate's Appropriations
Committee as "one of the most powerful people in the state").
172. See JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 53; MAUER, supra note 3, at 92 (explaining that
corrections costs in the United States approach $60 billion annually).
173. Barkow, supra note 19, at 1287-88 (footnote omitted); see also Jennifer Steinhauer,
For $82 a Day, Booking a Cell in a 5-Star Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, at 1 (explaining that
California has allowed some low-risk criminals to pay for an upgrade to a more comfortable
jail, a policy that has generated hundreds of thousands of dollars a year for municipalities).
174. See JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 85 (discussing how 25 states reduced their corrections
budgets in 2002 because of budget shortfalls); RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AN ERA OF FISCAL RESTRAINT
(2002); Barkow, supra note 87, at 807.
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found that in 2003, thirty-one states passed laws to address the skyrocketing
costs of corrections. 175 In particular, five states passed laws reducing the
lengths of sentences, a dozen states passed legislation favoring drug
treatment over more expensive incarceration, six states adopted more
flexible parole and probation policies, and nearly a dozen states expanded
early release programs. 176 In total, more than two dozen states reduced their
corrections budgets in 2002. 177 Nine states reported a net decrease in
corrections expenditures in 2003 and fourteen states announced such an
accomplishment in 2004. 178
Legislators have even become averse to spending more money on new
prisons and jails. 179 When Colorado legislators learned that they would need
to allocate $500 million to house 7000 prisoners over the next five years,
some opposed the project on the grounds that it would "eat up our entire
budget." 180 In Washington State, lawmakers tried to avoid building a new
prison because the cost exceeded $200 million. 181 In Texas, which
incarcerates more inmates per 100,000 residents than every state in the
nation save Louisiana and Georgia, 182 two prominent (and bipartisan)
lawmakers recently opposed the Department of Criminal Justice's request to
construct three new prisons estimated to cost nearly $500 million. 183 Even
175. See JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES OR
CHANGING ATTITUDES?: SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003, at 3 tbl.l (2004).
176. See id. at 6-7; JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 90.
177. See DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, Is THE
BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THEWAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 2 (2002).
178. WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 175, at 2. Unfortunately, reducing corrections costs does
not always mean decreasing imprisonment. In some instances, states cut costs by closing prisons
or reducing guards, while leaving the number of inmates relatively constant. See JACOBSON,
supra note 24, at 86. This in turn leads to more overcrowding and a worsening of confinement
conditions. See id.; see also Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,2003, at AI.
179. Unfortunately, when many legislatures make long-term criminal justice policy they do
not consider the long-term incarceration costs. For instance, while some states have abandoned
three-strikes-and-you're-out legislation due to the costs of constructing and operating prisons,
other states adopted such statutes without fully considering the costs that would arise decades
later. See Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and a Sinking Fund Proposal, 8 FED.
SENT'G REP. 80 (1995).
180. Imse, supra note 13, at A4 ("'It's going to eat up our entire budget,' [a budget
committee member] said when the Joint Budget Committee was told in January that it had to
come up with half a billion dollars to house 7,000 more prisoners in the next five years.").
181. See Joseph Turner, Huge Prison Bill on Its Way, THE NEWS TRIB., Oct. 8, 2006, at AI
("Lawmakers tried for several years to avoid building a full-fledged prison in Eastern
Washington because of its cost-$231 million.").
182. See HARRISON & BECK, supra note 33, at I (stating that Texas incarcerates 976
inmates per 100,000 residents).
183. See Lisa Sandberg, More Prisons Not Answer, 2 Texas Lawmakers Insist, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 28, 2006, at B4.
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more noteworthy, a Texas legislator opposed a request to spend $267
million to build new facilities to deal with chronic overcrowding in the
Harris County jails, taking the seemingly unpopular position that more
defendants should simply be released on bail. 184 Governors across the
country have even closed existing prisons in order to save money. 185
Recent opposition to prison funding is not surprising in times of tight
budgets because many states 186 require a balanced budget. 187 As prison costs
have skyrocketed, some legislators understandably have begun expressing
concerns about having enough funding for other public services such as
healthcare, education, and law enforcement. 188 A decade ago it may have
been impossible to consider cutting corrections budgets, for fear of being
perceived as weak on crime, today it is frequently contemplated. 189
In her recent (and excellent) book, Professor Marie Gottschalk expressed
skepticism that the high costs of incarceration will lead legislators to take
steps to decrease mass imprisonment. 190 Gottschalk explains that while
legislators might have the desire to cut costs at the margins, the prison184. See Bill Murphy, Not All Agree New Jails Needed: Lawmaker Says County Should Let
Some Offenders Out on Bail To Free Up Existing Cells, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 11, 2006, at
AI.
185. See Judith Greene & Vincent Schiraldi, Op-Ed., Cutting Prison Costs Is Tempting in
Times of Fiscal Crisis, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 27, 2002, at B9 ("Republican governors
in Ohio, Florida, Michigan and Illinois closed prisons last year as a cost-saving measure."
(emphasis omitted)).
186. My proposal is geared to state legislatures, not the federal system. As Professor Rachel
Barkow has cogently explained, while about half of the states have made serious efforts to
reduce their corrections expenditures in recent years, Congress has "shown little express
concern with the costs of sentencing and has continued to pursue a policy of even longer
sentences." Barkow, supra note 19, at 1304.
187. Unlike the federal government, most states have laws requiring balanced budgets. See
NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES 33 tbl.K (2002)
(listing states with balanced budget laws).
188. See JACOBSON, supra note 24, at 12 ("Even with a slowly recovering national
economy, states simply do not (and will not) have the revenue to continue prison expansion
while simultaneously supporting Medicaid, maintaining low tax rates, and adequately funding
education and health systems."); Barkow, supra note 19, at 1309 ("If the citizens in one state
would rather spend a greater proportion of their limited budget on education than the
construction of new prisons, they could adjust state sentencing policy accordingly."); Fox
Butterfield, As Cities Struggle, Police Get By With Less, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at AlO;
Imse, supra note 13, at A4 ("The bill for prisons plays a major role in tight funding for other
needs such as education and health care.").
189. See WESTERN, supra note 24, at 196 ("Indeed conservative governors and state
legislators, facing tight budgets and declining revenues, may be more eager to close prisons than
to raise taxes."); Chris Suellentrop, The Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2006, § 6 (Magazine) at 47 (discussing support for the Second Chance Act, which proposed
nearly $100 million in spending to assist states in returning prisoners to society).
190. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 22, at 240-45.
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industrial complex is too entrenched to permit dramatic change. 191 As she
puts it, "the construction of the carceral state was the result of a complex set
of historical, institutional, and political developments. No single factor
explains its rise, and no single factor will bring about its demise." 192 If
Gottschalk is correct, and I believe she is, then legislative or bureaucratic
action is unlikely to cause drastic change. Yet, the proposal I offer is not
intended to trigger dramatic change, a prospect I view as unrealistic. 193
Rather, my proposal explores the possibility of reducing mass imprisonment
at the margins as a way to reset the baseline over a lengthy period of time.
Given recent legislative trends to trim corrections budgets, such a modest
proposal may be plausible.
V.

CONCLUSION

The problem of mass imprisonment in the United States took decades to
create and it will not be cured overnight. Nevertheless, there are steps that
can be taken to encourage the system's most powerful actorsprosecutors-to exercise their authority in a manner likely to decrease
incarceration. Social psychology research suggests that if prosecutors were
better advised of escalating imprisonment numbers and the overcrowding of
prisons and jails, they would likely offer marginally lower plea bargains.
The marginally lower plea bargains would thereby reduce incarceration at
the margins. Over time, these marginal decreases in incarceration would
have a noteworthy impact on the mass imprisonment problem. Legislatures
have an incentive to institute an informational campaign because it carries a
low risk of being labeled soft on crime while holding out a potential benefit
of significant savings on correctional costs.

191. !d. at 244.
192. !d.
193. Gottschalk, for instance, sets as her goal reducing the incarceration rate to about 110
prisoners per 100,000 people, which amounts to a decrease of75% of the prison population. See
id. at 238. By contrast, I would be pleased to see a decrease of 5%. See also WESTERN, supra
note 24, at 198 ("The self-sustaining character of mass imprisonment as an engine of social
inequality makes it likely that the penal system will remain as it has become, a significant
feature on the new landscape of American poverty and race relations.").
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